state has no business compelling employers to be efficient. He also rejects the more strongly egalitarian claim that people's life-prospects should not depend on factors for which they are not personally responsible. In place of these two principles, which can be seen as components of the broader notion of equality of opportunity, Cavanagh suggests two more limited ideas: that employers (and others) should not behave in a wrongfully discriminatory way, where wrongful discrimination is defined as treating people with unwarranted contempt, and that everyone should have some opportunity to take control of their lives. The first idea is intended to show why we find crude racial or sexual discrimination unfair, and the second to show why we are concerned about people who from the outset have very few opportunities of any kind.
I want to focus my critical remarks on two aspects of Cavanagh's argument. The first is his rejection of the idea that the best qualified candidate for a job deserves it and is therefore treated unfairly if she is not given it. Cavanagh rejects this by distinguishing between desert and merit, and arguing that desert is always about being rewarded for what you have done in the past, whereas merit indicates one's capacity to do the job in the future. (Cavanagh doesn't deny that employers have a reason to give jobs to those with the greatest merit, but he claims that this can be trumped by other reasons, for instance need, or the personal preferences of the employer. Merit claims do not entail justice claims in the way that desert claims do.) He is right to say that jobs are not deserved as rewards for past performance; but where he goes astray -and this is where some background reading would have helped -is in thinking that this is the only way to make sense of the idea of deserving a job. (One of the great merits of Feinberg and Sher's work is precisely that it highlights just how diverse desert claims can be -in particular how the basis of desert changes depending on the kind of benefit that someone is said to deserve.)
Cavanagh agrees that people who do productive work can deserve the income that they receive for doing it (he also thinks that the market rate for labour might be a reasonable measure of desert). But he believes this can be disconnected from the idea that jobs must be given to the best-qualified candidates. He considers the case of a violinist who makes a fine recording of a piece of music, and deserves to be paid a certain amount for his services. However, it is absurd to suggest that this idea must somehow be tempered by the thought that as far as getting the job in the first place is concerned, he was no more deserving than a number of other candidates ' (p. 88) . But is it absurd? If all the candidates were equally qualified, then of course it was fine to pick this violinist at random. But suppose one or more of the other applicants was in fact a slightly better musician. Then assuming the record company wanted a top-quality recording, and set the fee accordingly, the violinist they chose does not deserve the reward he now receives, but something less. The only way to ensure justice in the outcome was to ensure that the best musician was picked (assuming that one or more of the applicants was good enough: if not, picking the best among them at least minimizes injustice). So, the best qualified applicant deserves the job, because otherwise he is unfairly deprived of the opportunity to earn the rewards the job brings with it, and some other candidate will unfairly earn more than he deserves. This is genuine desert, linked to desert of reward, but not reducible to it.
Another aspect of Cavanagh's argument that warrants comment is his narrow view of discrimination. Whether an employer's practice, even of racial or sexual discrimination, is unfair depends on the intention that guides it. It is not unfair, Cavanagh argues, if an employer discriminates because he prefers working with whites or if he believes his customers have a similar preference. Equally, it is not unfair if selection by sex or race is used as a rule of thumb to track some other job-related characteristic. So in a society run according to Cavanagh's principles it would be reasonable to expect some quite sharp patterning of life-prospects along the lines of race, gender, sexual orientation, and so forth, and this is justified because employers have the right to employ whom they choose so long as this does not involve unfair discrimination (i.e. treating people with unwarranted contempt). But what would the impact of this be on social relationships within the society? Cavanagh makes it clear that he does regard employers as having wider social responsibilities as well as personal and property rights -this is one aspect of his not being a Nozickstyle libertarian. Indeed, when he discusses the reasons that can be given for favouring principles of equality -say in allocating voting rights -he appears sensitive to the idea that there can be value in people being related to one another in certain ways, for instance as equal participants in a collective enterprise. In a society in which blacks, women and other groups tend to lose out systematically to their white male etc. counterparts, it is going to be difficult to prevent these groups from being regarded, and regarding themselves, as inferior, and it might be thought that employers had a collective responsibility to prevent this happening. Even if one does not believe in meritocracy, there can be good reasons for anti-discrimination legislation that is more rigorous than Cavanagh would allow. To hear irrealists about morality tell it, morality's defenders should no longer be alarmed by the irrealist conclusion that moral statements are necessarily false. Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard have argued, albeit in different fashions, that although moral judgements are not true, we can still salvage the objectivity of moral discourse, and perhaps even show that moral discourse and reasoning are beneficial or indispensable. In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce offers a sophisticated variant of this benign irrealism. Morality, in so far as it imposes categorical requirements on our conduct, is a myth, Joyce argues. But Joyce advocates that we adopt a 'fictionalist' stance toward moral discourse, deploying such predicates as 'right', 'wrong', 'virtuous,' etc., but without asserting or believing the propositions in which those predicates appear. We are to 'make believe' that such moral statements are true, despite our disbelieving them.
Joyce's book in effect has two components. In the first part, he defends a moral error theory. Essential to moral discourse, Joyce argues, is that morality issues categorical imperatives, demands meant to apply to agents regardless of such contingent facts as what agents desire. Hence, morality is only vindicated if all agents have reasons to be moral, regardless of their desires. Here Joyce appeals to an instrumentalist and internalist conception of practical reason to show that such agent-neutral reasons, and a fortiori, moral obligations, do not exist. The argument of the second part is essentially Hobbesian. Joyce appeals to the evolutionary advantageousness of moral discourse to suggest why we should retain that discourse but within a fictionalist framework. By investing co-operative actions that are generally beneficial with a moral aura of inherent to-be-doneness, we forestall our falling prey to weakness of will, short-term thinking and other infirmities that, at least in the long run, will cause us not to enjoy the desire satisfaction that co-operation with others brings.
On the whole, this is a lucid, tightly argued volume, mercifully free of needless jargon. Joyce readily anticipates and addresses likely objections to both his error theory and his fictionalist proposal. The early chapters, in which Joyce clarifies the notion of an error theory and puts forth his own account of the basic claims to which any moral discourse must be committed, are especially valuable. A good deal of the argument is sensible, even ingenious. Joyce's argument for the practical utility of seeing moral requirements as categorical contains the seeds of an intriguing and possibly convincing reply to Hobbes's Foole. For if, as Joyce argues, (1) evolution would favour the development of an attitude that treats prudentially justified co-operative behaviours as categorical moral imperatives, because (2) having such an attitude leads us to engage in co-operation with others that might otherwise be prevented by our shortsightedness, akrasia, etc., then he has identified both a naturalistic explanation for that attitude and a fictionalist argument against the Foole's scepticism.
Still, in my estimation, the conception of practical reason on which Joyce rests his error theory is questionable. In particular, I wonder if his move to a more robustly normative form of internalism is in fact a rejection of internalism. Joyce's favoured account of reasons holds that individual S has a reason to φ if and only if S is justified in believing that her counterpart, S+ (i.e. S granted full information and idealized powers of reflection) would advise S to φ (p. 100). Such an account is seemingly instrumentalist and internalist, since S's reasons are determined by her ends and these ends are simply those desires that S+ would recommend to S. One reason Joyce adopts this 'nonHumean instrumentalism' is because standard Humean instrumentalism fails to provide practical rationality with any normative bite: If we will act to satisfy our desires as a 'matter of psychological fact', as Hume seemed to believe, then we cannot fail to be rational (p. 57). Joyce's own view not only makes practical rationality normative, but it indicates how an individual's reasons are the result of epistemic success, i.e. how a person can be right or wrong about what reasons she has.
Joyce also prefers internalism because of its apparent advantage over externalism in showing how reasons can explain action. But I am not here concerned with that dispute, but with just how internalist Joyce's conception of practical rationality turns out to be. Rather than introducing an innocuous normativity, one compatible with internalism, Joyce's move to the recommendations of a fully informed counterpart casts serious doubt on this as an internalist position. Joyce claims that the things 'an ideal version of myself wants for me always depend on what I actually desire' (p. 76). But why should we not think that what the ideal version of myself, who is maximally informed, fully reflective, etc., recommends to me is not what I would want given my desires, but what is in fact desirable independently of whether I desire it, now or ever? The greater the cognitive distance between S (and her actual desires) and S+ (and the desires it recommends to S), the less likely it is that S+ is recommending an epistemically perfected version of S's actual desires, and the more likely it is that S+'s recommendations derive from the objective features of the ends S+ recommends. These worries aside, by dispelling the common, crude picture of irrealism as simply at odds with the fundamental features of moral life as we know it, The Myth of Morality will force morality's philosophical allies to come to grips with a position that promises to reconcile morality's apparent objectivity with its problematic claims to truth. Joyce's volume offers fruitful avenues of exploration for both realists and irrealists alike. The idea of utilitarianism in Geneva in the early nineteenth century is of course associated above all with the name of the man who was arguably Bentham's greatest disciple, Etienne Dumont (1759-1829), but Dumont was not the only Genevan to take an interest in Bentham in this period. Jean-Jacques de Sellon (1782-1840) was an ardent campaigner for the reform of the parliamentary system and the abolition of the death penalty, and he cited Bentham repeatedly in numerous pamphlets. Another who was fired by Dumont's recensions of Bentham was Antoine-Elysée Cherbuliez. Such was the enthusiasm of Cherbuliez for Benthamism that he founded a journal called L'Utilitaire in 1829. Unfortunately this was not a success, and it closed down in March 1831. Alexis Keller attributes this demise to various causes -changes in the European political climate for one -but he does not elaborate on which changes, and what relationship they might bear to utilitarianism. Another cause is located by Keller in Cherbuliez's growing awareness of the limitations of utilitarian theory. Finally, Keller says that he was alienated by the intolerance and bigotry of Bentham's disciples, in so far as they were determined to represent their theory as somehow unprecedented, a brand-new product of the human mind. This is a reminder of the presence of another powerful school of thought in European culture at the time -the historical school. The name of Savigny was to be conjured with, and Cherbuliez too (like Pellegrino Rossi) felt his attraction.
Keller is not greatly interested in Cherbuliez the utilitarian; his study focuses on the later political thought, in which Cherbuliez moved on to liberalism-with-a-social-conscience, a liberalism that also believed in elites and that remained deeply anxious, along with the likes of Mill and Tocqueville, about the levelling tendencies and the threat to minorities implied in the contemporary global trend towards democracy. Keller rightly perceives the paradoxical love-hate relationship between liberalism and democracy as a defining feature of modernity, although it is doubtful whether he succeeds in his attempt to show that Cherbuliez's particular take on the issue is worthy of renewed attention. On the other hand, Keller's study is a helpful reminder in these days of obsession with human rights discourse that there was another kind of classical liberalism with a different kind of discourse, a discourse in which the public facet of human existence has a key role and the state presides more concernedly over the market. For Cherbuliez belongs to a type of liberalism which is alienated by natural rights discourse, and this seems to be one reason for his early attraction to Bentham. Cherbuliez came from a Genevan background in which a liberal style of thinking had emerged out of classical republican values. It is a pity that for all the lucidity and clarity of his exposition of Cherbuliez's thought, Keller does not attempt to describe this background in any depth, nor does he give us a picture of the Genevan intellectual ferment of the 1820s in which Cherbuliez came to maturity. This was a very rich period in Genevan intellectual history, which remains unchronicled and is totally unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world. Of the stars in Geneva's intellectual firmament at the time -Pellegrino Rossi, Etienne Dumont, P.-F. Bellot, Sismondi -only the last name has any resonance in Anglo-Saxon culture, and his Genevan identity remains a well-kept secret. Of the four only Dumont succumbed entirely to the siren charms of Benthamism, while the others remained for the most part -though not completely -immune. For a while it seemed that Cherbuliez, who began to publish L'Utilitaire a few months before Dumont died, might take up the torch for him. Keller devotes only a few pages to L'Utilitaire, passing up the opportunity to provide any analysis of its contents or any detail about editorial policies. What he does pick out, however, is interesting; he focuses on unpublished Bentham manuscript material dealing with the need for the members of a country's legislature to be kept on their toes -'guarantees of legislative aptitude'. This was one of Bentham's favourite subjects -the ineluctable tendency for all individuals to put their own interests above those of the collectivity, which meant that all sorts of controls had to be in place to ensure that a country's legislators were not allowed to bow to this temptation. Bentham outlined the principles of a representation in the hands of the literate adult citizens of a nation, with deputies subjected to the controls of frequent elections. Keller argues, perhaps with justification, that this example of tight utilitarian reasoning applied to political practice was what appealed to Cherbuliez in Bentham's philosophy. Like so many of his generation, Cherbuliez distanced himself from the 'abstractions' of Enlightenment thought and sought to construct a political role for the intelligentsia. Henceforth intellectuals needed to engage in practical reform activity. For this kind of approach, of course, Bentham was your man.
Cherbuliez abandoned Benthamism in the early 1830s in favour of a more eclectic style of thought. He was appointed Professor at the Academy of Geneva in 1833. In 1846 a radical revolution in his home territory left him alienated, and he left Geneva for good in 1847. He spent his last years in Zurich. Keller does not provide a proper biographical framework for his study and a great deal of knowledge of Swiss politics is taken for granted in his book. This is unfortunate, in that he is attempting to tie Cherbuliez in with major European currents of thinking. It will assuredly limit the attractiveness of Keller's work to the broader European readership he would obviously like to address. As Georgios Varouxakis observes in the introduction to Mill on Nationality, since the middle of the 1990s political theorists have been grappling more and more with the phenomenon of nationalism in general, and with the relation between liberalism and nationalism in particular. Because the leading liberal philosopher of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, had a considerable amount to say about nationalism and nationality, it is unsurprising that he figures prominently in the work of these theorists. Yet, as Varouxakis documents, not many people are familiar with Mill's writings on nationality beyond a few familiar and oft-quoted passages, and they sometimes misunderstand what they have read through a failure to appreciate Mill's historical context. Thus there is a pressing need for a systematic exegesis of Mill's views on nationalism and related topics, which is what Varouxakis aims to present here. Throughout, Varouxakis is a careful, insightful and charitable interpreter.
Among the contemporary theorists whom Varouxakis takes to have misunderstood Mill are Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh. Varouxakis shows, contra Kymlicka, that Mill did not hold that it is always desirable for small nations to be absorbed into large 'great nations'. While Mill may have favoured the absorption of less advanced and less energetic nations by others that are more civilized and vigorous, size per se was not a factor. Parekh takes a wellknown passage in Considerations on Representative Government, which says in part that 'Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque . . . to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people . . . than to sulk on his own rocks', to suggest that when less civilized groups are assimilated they should be forced to adopt the 'way of life' of the more civilized group that has absorbed them. Yet Varouxakis demonstrates that Mill is not committed to this claim. Admittedly, bringing the members of a less civilized community 'into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people' would surely involve some alterations in their prior way of life, but it need not require them to adopt wholesale the way of life of the assimilating society. Moreover, Varouxakis shows, both Kymlicka and Parekh are mistaken when they assert that Mill favoured the anglicization of French Canadians, and Parekh is wrong when he further contends that Mill wanted to see the Indians anglicized as well.
The third and fourth chapters of the book compose a two-part discussion of Mill's views on national character. The first of these addresses the question of how far Mill took national character to be determined by race. Varouxakis's answer is that he did see race as having some influence, but that he never saw it as more than one factor among several, and that after the mid-1840s he made special efforts to emphasize its relative unimportance. 'The shift', Varouxakis suggests, 'was probably due to his growing realization of the uses to which racialist theories were being put' (p. 47). It is noteworthy that Mill made a point of contesting the imputations of racial inferiority made against Africans (by Carlyle in particular) and the Irish. Chapter 4 attempts to clarify Mill's conception of national character, in so far as this is possible, and discusses his differing views of the English and French national characters. Varouxakis concludes that the failure of the French republican government of 1848 led Mill to consider national character to be less subject to change than he had previously, and to question whether a highly civilized people like the French might nevertheless have a national character that is unable to sustain free government.
Varouxakis's concluding chapter contains his final statement on Mill's assessment of the desirability of national attachments, whether these are described as nationalism, patriotism or public spirit, although of course the earlier chapters touch on this as well. Varouxakis's main conclusions are wellsupported, and really unassailable: Mill was ultimately a cosmopolitan, in the sense that he believed that the well-being of all humans is equally valuable, and as we would expect from a utilitarian his evaluations of the desirability of national attachments were made from this standpoint. Having recognized, however, that it will be a long time before the average person is ready to practise a cosmopolitan 'Religion of Humanity', he realized that until that day arrives it might be better, judged from a cosmopolitan-utilitarian perspective, for people to form national attachments than for them to be narrowly selfinterested. Yet these national attachments are valuable only if they do not lead to behaviour that is undesirable from a cosmopolitan-utilitarian perspective, which they will do if they take the form of 'nationality in the vulgar sense of the term; a senseless antipathy to foreigners', rather than merely 'a strong and active principle of cohesion among the members of the same community or state' (these phrases are from Mill's essay 'Coleridge', and are also found in his System of Logic).
Varouxakis does deal rather quickly with some matters that should probably have been considered at greater length. In chapter 2, for example, he implies that the national attachments that Mill favoured were based on reason rather than 'unreflective' sentiment, and indeed on 'enlightened self-interest' (p. 29). In fact, in this earlier chapter Varouxakis states that Mill saw national sentiments purely as obstacles to be overcome, not anything to be 'encouraged, promoted, or cherished' (p. 31 ). Yet sentimental ties between co-nationalsbonds of sympathetic fellow-feeling -are clearly central to Mill's conception of the desirable sort of national attachments. This sympathetic fellow-feeling may not be what Varouxakis means by 'unreflective' sentiment, but it is not necessarily 'reflective' either. Action based on it could be described as selfinterested, but only if the agent's interests have come to include a genuine concern for the well-being of others. This is expanded rather than enlightened self-interest, since 'enlightened' only seems to connote something like 'longterm'. It would have been helpful if Varouxakis had been able to sort out in greater detail the relations between reason and sentiment and between self-interest and fellow-feeling in Mill's understanding of the national (and cosmopolitan) attachments that he wanted to foster. This would not have been a trivial undertaking, but the book is quite slim; perhaps adding another chapter would not have been impossible.
But this is merely a quibble. Mill on Nationality is a timely and valuable addition to the literature both on Mill and on nationality. Scholars with an interest in either subject will read it with great profit.
